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Introduction
With the development of high-tech indus tries, many regions put their economic priori ties on innovation techniques in order to obtain high-tech oriented industrial development. Re gional planners have viewed decentralization of production, facilitated by information technol ogy, as a key to regional industrial develop ment (Amirahmadi and Wallace 1995) . At tempts have been made to consolidate these activities following decentralization from large urban areas, and to form innovative regions for long-term economic development.
The Japa nese "Technopolis Plan" was one of these at tempts to attract high-tech industries (decen tralized from the large urban areas) to desig nated regions and to form industrial develop ment areas.
There have been many studies on the Tech nopolis Plan by both Japanese (Yamazaki 1992; Itoh 1998; Tanaka 1996; Fujita 1988) and West ern economic geographers (Glasmeier 1988; Stohr and Ponighaus 1992; Sternberg 1995; Masser 1990 ) since the plan was established in 1983. Each Technopolis has its 5-year targets in manufacturing production value, workers, productivity, and population. Most of the Tech nopolis studies emphasized two points: the weakness of the Technopolis Plan itself (Ya mazaki 1992; Glasmeier 1988; Takeuchi 1996) , and the goal achievement of Technopolis areas (Yamazaki 1992; Ito 1998; Tanaka 1996; JILC 1997; Stohr and Ponighaus 1992; Sternberg 1995) . Through these studies, the failure of the Technopolis Plan became clear. Some of the main reasons for this failure include: designa tion of many Technopolis areas with insuf ficient central government support, mismatch of expected economic impact and decentralized production facilities, and production shift to Southeast Asia following the appreciation of the Japanese yen.
In fact, Technopolis development involves two steps. The first step is to attract decentral ized high-tech plants from the large urban areas. The second step is to construct the com plex technology linkages between these cen tralized plants and existing plants, local univer sities, and government R & D facilities. With the construction of these technology linkages, the development of self-motivated industrial re gions was expected. In addition, most Techno polis areas changed their strategy from the at traction of high-tech plants (gaihatsugata) to technology development of the existing plants (naihatsugata) after the first five-year plan ended in 1990.1 Accordingly, the construction of technology linkages between industry, uni versity, and government became more impor tant. However, little is known about the reality of technology linkage development. Therefore, this paper tries to analyze the situation of tech nology linkage construction using the example of Koriyama technopolis. This study will com centrate only on high-tech plants since they are the main players, both in technology linkage construction and regional economic develop ment.
There were three macro-scale regional devel opment projects in Japan: the New Industrial Cities Plan, the Technopolis Plan, and the Brain Location Plan. The Koriyama technopolis re gion is one of the few areas that are designated by these three regional development projects. In addition, since the Koriyama technopolis is located at the southern entrance of the Tohoku region, and at the crossroads of the Tohoku and Joban expressways, it has excellent transport links. The plan itself anticipated that the Tech nopolis area would become a principal innova tion point between the Tokyo area and the Tohoku region. Moreover, some previous stud ies indicate that the Technopolis areas located near Tokyo have better high-tech plant forma tion rates than those in the remote areas (Stohr and Ponighaus 1992; Sternberg 1995; Yamazaki 1992) . This is another reason for choosing Ko riyama technopolis as the study area since it is located at the edge of the Kanto area and at the entrance of the Tohoku region.
To understand the responses of high-tech plants to the Technopolis functions, the follow ing points were examined.
What location fac tors are considered important by the high-tech plants when moving to the area?
How are backward (subcontracting) and forward (mar keting) linkages formed? And how is technol ogy transferred along these linkages? How do high-tech plants respond to the presence of in dustry-university-government research co-op eration?
There cial areas (Takeuchi 1996) . In order to over come such regional disparities, the "Compre hensive National Development Plan" was estab lished in 1962. The main actions of this plan were the establishment of "New Industrial Cit ies" and "Special Areas for Industrial Consolida tion." Remote coastal areas suitable for heavy and chemical industries were designated as New Industrial Cities in order to promote indus trial dispersal and reduce regional imbalance. The Special Areas for Industrial Consolidation were designated along the Pacific coastal belt to sustain economic growth and industrial devel opment (Murata 1980) . As a result of severe competition for the designation of these areas, 16 New Industrial Cities and 5 Special Areas for Industrial Consolidation were finally desig nated. However, only a few districts were able to increase the population as expected (Take uchi 1996) .
In 1969, the "New Comprehensive National Development Plan" was established under the high economic development of Japan. It aimed to form large-scale industrial districts in many areas that would be connected by highways and new trunk railways. Although traffic net works were completed, the plan was not contin ued because of the depression caused by oil shocks in the 1970s (Takeuchi 1996) .
The Ministry of International Trade and In dustry (MITI) enacted the "Industrial Reloca tion Law" in 1972. Based on this law the "In dustrial Relocation Plan" was established in 1977. This plan aimed to attract industries from excessively congested areas (departure promotion areas) and to relocate them to less concentrated areas (relocation reception areas) and to change industrial location. Departure promotion areas were the Tokyo region and Kinki region, and the built up area of Nagoya City. Relocation reception areas covered 86.5 of the national land (Murata 1980) .
With the "Third Comprehensive National De velopment Plan" (1977) , new plant construction in the big cities was strictly limited and indus trial decentralization was attempted in ten dis tricts. This plan aimed to settle a certain popu lation in each districts, to establish their life zone on a laminated scale, and to enrich social investment in national land planning (Takeuchi 1996) .
After the oil crisis of the 1970s, Japanese industrial policy also changed from promoting heavy and chemical industries to promoting high-tech industries2 (Yamazaki 1997) . Then, high-tech related industrial development poli cies were realized by the "Technopolis Plan" in 1983. The aims of the Technopolis Plan were to promote manufacturing oriented R & D of ex isting industries, to establish knowledge-ori ented R & D, and to create new industries. To realize this plan, a new organizational structure of technical linkage between industries, univer sities, and government was considered. As with the case of New Industrial Cities, pressure from local governments caused the national Techno polis project to become a local project with the designation of 26 areas during 1984 and 1989 (Itoh 19989 Yamazaki 1992) .
In 1986, the "Private Participation Law" was enacted. Through this law, the Research Core, Telecom Research Park, New Media Center, Telecom Plaza, and Multimedia Tower projects were established.
Of these, the Research Core Program was closely associated with MITI's in dustrial location policy (Yamazaki 1997) . The Research Core Program consists of four facili ties: an open-type test and research facility, a human resources development facility, a facil ity for promoting technology exchange, and an incubator for new business. Eleven centers in cluding Tsukuba, Kanagawa and Senri (Osaka) were designated by MITI (Takeuchi 1996) .
In 1986, the Techno-mart program was started with the aim of providing necessary information for firms at the inter-firm, inter industry, and inter-region level through the network.
Reduction of the technological gap between large urban areas and provincial areas was expected through this program. MITT as sumed this program to be important for the success of Technopolis and this network was constructed within most Technopolis areas. In addition, Research Cooperation Centers were established in national universities and have promoted university-industry technology rela tionships since 1987. These centers are not only sources of human resources, production technology development, and technology trans fer, but are also bases of information supply.
Through this program more than 47 Research Cooperation Centers were established in 40 pre fectures (Itoh 1998) .
The "Fourth Comprehensive National Devel opment Plan" was established in 1987. This plan aimed to avoid an excessive concentration of economic activities in the Tokyo region by creating a more balanced national development based in Osaka, Nagoya, and high-order re gional central cities. It was designed to develop the R & D capacity of Technopolis and core cities, to enable them to compete with Tokyo, and to use them as bases for promoting the dispersal and relocation of industry. The main theme of the Fourth Comprehensive National Development
Plan was "Multipolar Patterns National Land Formation."
In response to eco nomic progress, and much emphasis on the soft ware and service sectors, MITT enacted the "Brain Location Law ." It promoted the concen tration of knowledge functions of industrial firms in provincial areas by supporting the dis persal of 16 business categories, including re search institutes, the engineering industry, and the software industry. These projects involved combining government, business, universities, and research institutes to create incubation cen ters with environments conductive to the emer gence of new high-technology enterprises.
The intention was that growth stimuli from these centers would percolate into surrounding areas (Takeuchi 1996) . In accordance with the Brain Location Law, 26 areas were designated.
In 1989 the industrial relocation plan was revised and the "New Industrial Relocation Plan" was established.
In this new plan, high tech industries, service industries, and R & D were attracted to the designated areas. In addi tion, human resources development, construc tion, and enforcement of test and research fa cilities, and networking among these R & D were implemented.
The main characteristic of the industrial policies of the 1990s was con struction of networks among the designated industrial bases through Technopolis and the Brain Location Laws (Yamazaki 1997) .
In sum, from the 1980s the regional industrial development policy of Japan changed from resource-based industries to high-tech indus tries and technology development. According ly, the emphasis was gradually shifted from pure production function to production, R & D, management and service functions through the construction and utilization of information networks.
Effective financial assistance also shifted from central to local government. How ever, the following two points have not changed: many industrial development plans have many designated areas, and the majority of the industrial policies are related to the de centralization of production and decision func tions from densely concentrated large urban areas to less concentrated regions. Until the 1950s, the industries of the Kori yama area were based on farm products and natural resources. However, after the designa tion of the Joban-Koriyama New Industrial City area, heavy and chemicals industries became the principal economic activities here. In the 1970s, electrical machinery and other machine part assembly plants came to occupy an in creasing share of industrial output. In 1986, the interior districts covered by the New Industrial City Plan were designated as the Koriyama technopolis area.
This technopolis area in cludes Koriyama City as "Mother City" and also Sukagawa City, Kagamiishi Town, Ishikawa Town, Miharu Town and Tamagawa Village. In 1991, according to the "Brain Location Plan," Koriyama City and Sukagawa City became "In dustrial Agglomeration areas" and other towns and village of the Koriyama technopolis be came "Surrounding Areas" of industrial devel opment (Figure 1) .
The main industrial activities of the Kori yama technopolis area include production and assembly of musical instruments, production of electronic communication and transportation machinery (such as automobile parts), chemical industries such as those for industrial and medi cal chemical production, and food and soft drink processing.
Particularly prominent are production and assembly of musical instru ments, and information and communication machinery. For the sustainable development of new technology, industries using microelec tronic technology, and biotechnology, were es pecially encouraged, and improvements were made in the development of new material pro duction technology (Fukushima Prefecture 1995) .
In the Koriyama Technopolis Plan, Koriyama City serves as the "Mother City" in which a high-class living environment is found. Also, other industrial development functions such as telecommunication and financial centers are lo cated here. In the Mother City's "Technology Corridor Zone," technology centers, research and development centers, and high-technology industries were expected to be located together. Other development zones such as the "Eastern Development Zone," "Western Development Zone," and "Airport Development Zone" were designated as production development zones. The distribution of industrial estates, R & D parks, and new towns of the area, is shown in Figure 2 . It is intended that the Koriyama area will develop new social systems with the con struction of a high class living environment, and a high technology level based on techno logical collaboration between industry, univer sities, and government within the existing in frastructure of "Joban-Koriyama New Indus trial City." With the development of the Kori yama area, the final intention is to lead the Tohoku region in technological innovation, and to fulfill the objective of the "All Japan Techno Area" in the 21st century (KTKSK 1991 (KTKSK , 1997 . In 1956, KTPO was founded in accordance with the "Technopolis Law" to realize the Tech nopolis Plan. The principal functions of this organization include granting loans for indus trial innovation activities, the promotion of technology development and regional technol ogy diffusion, and the promotion of local entre preneurship.
After the designation of the Kori yama Brain Location area in 1991, KTPO also served as the main body for realizing the plan, and promoted industrial producer service and technology exchange functions (Fukushima Prefecture 1995 [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] Life related industries: food, beverage, textile products, clothing, lumber and wood products, furniture, pulp, paper and paper products, publishing and printing, rubber products, leather products and others. Basic material industries: chemicals, petroleum, plastics, ceramics, iron and steel, and metal products. Processing and manufacturing industries: machinery, electronic machinery, transport equipment, precision instruments and machinery. Sources: KTCPA (1991, p. 76; 1997, p. 76) . In other words, the Koriyama techno polis shows both local industrial linkage forma tion (the first and third types) and also the behavior of a branch-plant economy (the sec ond and third types) in accordance with its proximity to the Tokyo region.
Two methods of technology transfer can be expected in the area. The first method is the acquisition of technology from somewhere else (including intra-firm training) and the second method is technology transfer from the high tech plants to other local plants. In fact, most of the plants practiced intra-firm training meth ods (79.24%). In addition, technology acquisi tion from the forward linkages and public train ing centers were found here to some extent (30.19% and 24.52%, respectively) .
These fi gures indicate that some technology diffusion has occurred through forward industrial link ages and public training centers. On the other hand, a majority of high-tech plants (59.4%) have no technology transfer through their backward linkages.
Industry-university-government research co operation
In the Koriyama technopolis, KTPO has play ed the main role as a coordinator in various kinds of technology exchange, training, sympo siums, and as a dispenser or contributor of many kinds of subsidies.
In this section the responses of high-tech plants to the various measures of KTPO are examined.
Inter-plant technology exchange Accord ing to the respondents, 10 out of 53 plants conduct inter-plant technology exchange. Of these, 5 plants participate in a group form of technology exchange while the others utilize public research facilities for this exchange. Of these, two of the high-tech plants interviewed participate in technology exchange (Table 3) . The first plant (B) has been participating in group type research co-operation. According to the plant manager, group members have to ob serve the production process of each member's plant with the aim of developing new produc tion methods and products through the combi nation of different production fields.
However, this co-operation is merely the starting point and there is no development of new production technology as a result.
Another plant (F) is conducting research co-operation with a sales company for new product design. It is also at the first stage and there is no new design de velopment yet.
In the questionnaires, each plant is asked for their opinions on inter-plant research co-oper ation. The result is surprising: 23 out of 53 plants answered that this inter-plant research co-operation was not necessary for them. Most of the plants that answered that technology co-operation was necessary emphasized that they wanted to promote the technology level of their plants through this co-operation, and that in the future this co-operation would be essen tial. However, only a few plants that assumed research co-operation was necessary were actu ally doing it. On the other hand, the plants which answered that inter-plant research co operation was not necessary emphasized that the production technology obtained through their parent companies was good enough, and with their type of production it was not neces sary to conduct research. In fact, a majority of these plants are incoming plants,5 and other single-location plants6 which also feature mo nopolization of their own technology as a prim cipal means of competing in this time of severe competition.
Finally, the factors hindering inter-plant technology exchange are examined. A majority of plants have cited the lack of inter-plant con nection as a primary factor (52.2%). Again, answers favoring intra-firm links (within the fi rm itself or between mother firms and subsidi ary firms) suggest they regard their technology development as good enough for the foresee able future, and the tendency of monopolization of technology with the attitude "we don't want to transfer our technology to other plants" ac counted for nearly 50% (27.1% and 22,7%, re spectively) of responses. As regards other mi nor problems, some plants, especially incoming plants, said they had to get prior permission from the mother firm or headquarters to ad dress them. The previously mentioned 10 high tech plants conducting inter-plant technology exchange said a primary problem was that 'in ter-firm relations are inadequate, and informa tion regarding the other plants in the area is not clear.'
Technological co-operation between indus try and university According to the KTPO, the Engineering Department of Nihon Univer sity, the Dental Department of Ohu University, and the Food and Nutrient Department of Kori yama-joshi University are the main academic establishments in the area. In addition, Aizu University in Fukushima Prefecture was open ed in 1993. This university was expected to become the base of human resources develop ment related to information technology (KTKSK 1997) . The questionnaire survey shows that eight high-tech plants have collaborated with universities in developing new products and production technology.
Four of these are sin gle-location plants, one is a mother plant,7 and three are incoming plants. Three of the single location plants have engaged in technological co-operation with the universities located within the Koriyama technopolis, while another single-location plant has cooperated with the universities in both the Technopolis area and the Tokyo region. The mother plant and two of the incoming plants are in research co-oper ation with universities located in the Tokyo region. The remaining incoming plant is con ducting research co-operation with a university located in Miyagi Prefecture.
The pattern of research co-operation reveals that the plants accessible to the Tokyo region have a tendency to engage in research co-operation with univer sities located in Tokyo. There are three possi ble reasons for this situation. Firstly, since the universities located in the technopolis area are small and narrow in their fields of study, they do not offer matching specialized technology. Secondly, the research level of these universi ties is not high enough for new product de velopment.
Thirdly, the industry-university connection is not developed enough for re search co-operation.
However, regarding the second reason, no plant said that it was the lower research level of the universities that led to the lack of research co-operation. Thus, the problem seems to be due to the lack of proper contact, and mismatches between the research fi elds of the local industries and the local uni versities.
Of the plants interviewed, three are partici pating in industry-university research co-oper ation. The first plant (B) conducted research co-operation with the local university and used this to develop new production methods. This development led to the commercial production stage, with financial help from KTPO. How ever, this plant is no longer conducting such research co-operation. The reason is that the level of demand for the product (developed by industry-university research) was not high enough to justify further development. The second plant (F) also developed new products from industry-university research co-operation. However, as with the first plant, there was no reason to continue such research.
In fact, in terms of the cycle of industry-university co operative research development, the capital in vestment is solely on the industry side, and the resulting new products from the above co operation have proceeded to the stage of com mercial production in the same industry or pro duction plant as in the other areas. Then, this product is shipped to other plants to make the fi nished product, or to the consumer. The profit gained by selling the products is probably used for further research and development of new products and production methods. In the cases of two plants mentioned above, the research development cycle is broken down in the con sumption process. There are two possibilities here. One is that the product quality or produc tion method (geared towards minimum produc tion costs) is not of good enough quality to compete successfully in the local or global mar ket. The other is concerned with the wealth or income of the consumer.
In the second case, decreasing wealth or income has encouraged consumers to use both luxury and basic goods for as long as possible, delaying replacement, and as a result demand for new products is depressed. An important issue arising from this situation is whether or not the new products developed by local industry-university research co-operation can compete with the new prod ucts developed between the large companies and universities of the Tokyo area. Although the third plant (I) has been conducting research co-operation with the local university since 1997, there is no feedback from the university.
As regards the responses of high-tech indus tries to industry-university research co-oper ation, the majority of the plants (52.6%) an swered that such co-operation was not neces sary. The plants interested in conducting in dustry-university research development also pointed out that there was insufficient opportu nity for it.
Conclusions
The results of the surveys conducted in the Koriyama technopolis area lead to the follow ing conclusions.
1. In order to gain a competitive advantage, new plant formation seems to some extent to avoid already industrialized regions in their search for areas of low-production-cost.
On the other hand, the local universities and public research facilities in the technopolis area are not sufficiently developed for technology oriented plants to decentralize from large urban areas.
2. The university is a key center for basic research and human resources development in the provincial area. However, as is found in the Koriyama area, there is, for various reasons, no distinctive result from industry-university re search co-operation.
Although there are some cases of research co-operation, their results and prospects have not progressed well enough for long-term regional development.
3. One expectation of the Technopolis Plan is technology transfer from incoming plants to local plants. However, in the case of the Kori yama technopolis, although a certain amount of technology transfer did occur through forward and backward linkages, inter-plant research co operation did not take place as expected, for various reasons. In practice, many plants are conducting technology transfer with their mother-company and headquarters, without in volving the technopolis related organizations.
4. The main problems in the construction of a industry-university-government technology linkage stem from two related factors, namely the absence of proper information channels be tween the related plants, universities, and gov ernment facilities, which in turn means that high-tech plants are not interested in the results of technological cooperation.
These problems seem to stem from the nature of branch plants and the historical technological development of Japan. Research co-operation with industries was not allowed in Japanese universities until 1983 (Bass 1998 As a consequence, it can survive for a long time against rising production costs. 4. It is assumed that although cheap labor and land prices are very effective in attracting branch plants, it is difficult to sustain this com parative advantage for long. 5. These are all the plants that have no decision making function related to management and sales, and R & D. 6. They are the plants which contain their own management and sales, R & D, and production functions, and which have no other production plants. 7. They are the plants which contain their own management and sales, R & D, and production functions, and which also have other produc tion plants in different places.
